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friends, and community members over strangers and outsiders. In the last decade,
researchers have begun to propose several economic and evolutionary hypotheses
for these cross-population differences in parochialism. In this paper, we outline major
current theories and review recent attempts to test them. We also discuss the key
methodological challenges in assessing these diverse economic and evolutionary theories
for cross-population differences in parochialism.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last 200 years, the half million Iban living on Borneo’s
northwest region have undergone a remarkable transformation.
When first encountered by colonizers in the 19th century, Iban
lived in communal long-houses of 100–200 people and made a
living from farming rice and hunting (Freeman, 1970). According
to their festivals and mythology, Iban worked toward a commu-
nity that was harmonious, rich in rice, flush with children, and
endowed with an abundance of spiritual energy (Jensen, 1974;
Heppell et al., 2005). A key way of fostering such flourishing com-
munities was the taking of human heads—to cure a member of
one’s group or to rescue a member’s soul from limbo or from spir-
itual slavery in another region (Klokke, 2004). It is important to
note here that indiscriminate killing was not acceptable among
the Iban. Tribal groupings were defined in part as those people
who did not take each other’s heads. Killing a fellow group mem-
ber was considered a major transgression on the order of incest.
It could upset the universal order and could lead to sterility in
terms of offspring and rice production as well as the future taking
of heads (Freeman, 1970; Jensen, 1974; Sutlive, 1992).
Fast forward to today. After the forceful imposition of colonial
and state laws banning head-hunting, the practice is effectively
dead, and only a few elderly men still wield the hand tattoo
used to mark a successful headhunter (Freeman, 1970; Laukien,
2005). Iban engage in far-flung wage labor opportunities along-
side members of other ethnic groups with which they have
prior histories of war (Lumenta, 2003). They seek formal educa-
tion, consume Malaysian mass media, and many have converted
to dominant world religions, including Christianity and Islam.
Many Iban now also identify as citizens of Malaysia in addition to
being Iban (Lumenta, 2003; Postill, 2006). At times, violence rem-
iniscent of earlier times flares up (BBC News, 2001), but after two
centuries, most Iban have a very different way of defining insiders
and outsiders and very different views about appropriate social
behavior with other groups.
The Iban transformation illustrates three points. First, the
ways that people behave toward others can depend heavily on
how those others are classified—as kin, friends, and community
members or outsiders, strangers and foreigners. Second, human
populations can vary dramatically in: (1) how they define close-
ness and distance of a social partner and (2) how these qualities
of a partner influence social behavior. Third, these population
differences are not fixed or static. Populations can change quite
dramatically within several generations, in this case, from hunt-
ing the heads of neighboring groups to participating relatively
peacefully in a much larger nation-state and world system.
How people socially and psychologically construct boundaries
between insiders and outsiders or plot gradients of social distance
and how these models of boundaries and distance shape behav-
ior toward others are critical questions for a number of fields.
Current models for the evolution of human social behavior, and
of large-scale cooperation specifically, rely on the construction of
groups that can contain the fruits of cooperation, exclude out-
siders, and compete with other groups (Boyd et al., 2003; Choi
and Bowles, 2007). Paradoxically, the same tribal instincts that
may have fostered the human capacity for large-scale cooperation
today pose problems for building peaceful and just societies at
ever larger scales (Bernhard et al., 2006; Richerson and Henrich,
2012). They also underlaymany currently recognized problems in
today’s world, including favoritism, racial and ethnic discrimina-
tion, armed ethnic conflict, and genocide (Levine and Campbell,
1972).
In the past decade, researchers have proposed a number of
theories to account for these population differences in parochial-
ism and to explain historical changes like those observed among
Iban. However, these diverse approaches are relatively scattered
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across the social and behavioral sciences, they encompass a wide
range of motivations and behaviors under the broad rubrics of
in-group favoritism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and parochial
altruism, and these different theories rarely come into contact in
the same paper or analysis. In this paper, we clarify the diverse
ways that scholars have operationalized parochialism, we outline
and synthesize current hypotheses for cross-population variation
in parochialism, and we discuss key methodological challenges in
assessing these diverse economic and evolutionary hypotheses.
VARIETIES OF PAROCHIALISM
Humans do not have a general tendency to help, protect, or
harm others. Rather, these behaviors are conditioned by many
contextual factors (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011), including the
perceived need of the recipient (Taormina and Messick, 1983;
Engel, 2011), the legitimacy of the request for help (Bickman
and Kamzan, 1973), the degree to which someone deserves harm
or help (Skitka and Tetlock, 1992), genetic relatedness or kin-
ship with a person (Rachlin and Jones, 2008; Alvard, 2009), and
whether the individual or group are perceived to pose a threat
(Semyonov et al., 2004). The degree to which an actor feels
socially close to another individual also reliably guides social
behavior, whether social closeness is determined by subjective
assessments of a spatial metaphor (e.g., closeness or insideness) or
by common membership in a group (Leider et al., 2009; Goeree
et al., 2010; Mathew and Boyd, 2011; Branas-Garza et al., 2012).
Here, we refer to the broad tendency to rely on cues of social
closeness in guiding behavior as parochialism, a concept which
encompasses a number of related concepts including xenophobia,
ethnocentrism, and parochial altruism.
The social and behavioral sciences have a long tradition of
studying the proximate mechanisms by which social closeness and
group membership influence behavior toward others and how
groups emerge in experimental settings (Sherif, 1961; Tajfel et al.,
1971; Brewer, 1979; Glaeser et al., 2000; Hewstone et al., 2002;
Dovidio et al., 2005; Goette et al., 2006). All of these approaches
are united in studying how our decisions to help, protect or
harm someone are shaped by perceptions of social closeness.
However, these approaches also differ in two key respects: (1) in
how social closeness is operationalized, and (2) in what behav-
iors, preferences and motivations are considered. We review these
differences here.
OPERATIONALIZING SOCIAL CLOSENESS
Social closeness has been operationalized as both an ordinal
and categorical concept. As an ordinal concept, researchers have
assessed social closeness to a partner or a group in several ways, by
asking participants: (1) to rate partners on a Likert scale in terms
of “emotional closeness,” “we-ness,” or spatial overlap (Aron et al.,
1992; Myers and Hodges, 2012), (2) to rank partners in terms of
relative closeness (Rachlin and Jones, 2008), and (3) to indicate to
what degree one sees oneself as a member of a group (Inglehart
et al., 2006). A spatial metaphor is used to describe and assess this
concept in many, but not necessarily all languages (as in English,
Hruschka, 2010).
Operationalized as a categorical concept, social closeness is
based on participation in a relationship (e.g., close friend, family)
or on membership in a common group. This can be opera-
tionalized categorically in terms of the existence of a recognized
face-to-face relationship, including different kinds of kinship,
friendship, and acquaintanceship (Hruschka, 2010). It can also be
operationalized categorically in terms of common membership
in a larger group, such as a religion, denomination, nationality,
region, city, neighborhood, language, university, ethnicity, or race
(Hruschka and Henrich, 2013).
BEHAVIORS, PREFERENCES AND MOTIVATIONS
Parochialism is manifest in a number of behaviors, preferences
and motivations, which we classify here as avoidance, trust,
favoritism, permission to harm, and ingroup bias.
First, one can accept or avoid individuals of different groups
in everyday interaction (henceforth, avoidance). One of the first
attempts to assess parochialism, the Bogardus social distance
scale, used this approach by asking howmuch a respondent would
accept someone from another ethnic or religious group as a close
relative by marriage, as a close personal friend, as a neighbor on
the same street, as a co-worker, as a fellow citizen, and as a visitor
to one’s country (Bogardus, 1933; Inglehart et al., 2006). Second,
social closeness correlates with how much people report trust-
ing others. This creates different “radii of trust,” where people
generally report trusting family members more than personally
known others and neighbors, who in turn are trusted more than
individuals from other regions, ethnicities and countries (Allik
and Realo, 2004; Whitt, 2010; Delhey et al., 2011). Third, social
closeness can influence how we distribute resources or protect
others (favoritism), whether in allocating jobs (Van de Vliert,
2011) or money (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Bahry et al.,
2005; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Whitt, 2010), violating a rule to
help others (Trompenaars andHampden-Turner, 2000; Hruschka
et al., submitted) or acting to protect others (Bernhard et al.,
2006). Fourth, social closeness can shape how morally accept-
able it is to harm others or how hostile one feels toward others
(permission to harm) (Sutlive, 1992; Cashdan, 2001; Mathew and
Boyd, 2011). Fifth, people tend to rank socially close friends, fam-
ily and community members as better than others. This ingroup
bias can be expressed as pride in family or country or relative
ratings of competence, intelligence, or other positive qualities
(Brown, 1986; Evans and Kelley, 2002). Researchers have mea-
sured these different behaviors, motivations and preferences in
several ways, as self-reported attitudes (Evans and Kelley, 2002),
behavior in hypothetical scenarios (Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner, 2000; Whitt, 2010), behavior with real monetary stakes
(Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Bahry et al., 2005), and real-world
behavior (Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010).
In addition to these specific manifestations of parochialism,
researchers have also deployed several general measures derived
from factor analyses intended to capture investment in one’s local
group. Perhaps the best known measure is collectivism, or the
tendency to care about the consequences of one’s behavior for in-
groupmembers and to be willing to sacrifice personal interests for
collective gains (Triandis et al., 1988; Hofstede, 2001). Schwartz’s
measure of embeddedness also falls into this category and cap-
tures restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt group
solidarity or the traditional order (Schwartz, 2006).
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Little research has focused on how these diverse measures
of parochialism covary across individuals and populations. In a
sample of 186 small-scale societies, between-society variation in
hostile attitudes toward other ethnic groups was not correlated
with the degree of belonging to one’s own ethnic group (Cashdan,
2001). However, a number of measures of avoidance, favoritism,
and ingroup bias are highly correlated across countries, and these
also correlate with other non-specific measures of collectivism
and embeddedness (Hruschka and Henrich, 2013). Interestingly,
the tendency to favor socially close others appears to extend
across diverse social scales, all the way from family to nation.
For example, increased population levels of parochialism at one
level (e.g., the immediate family) are moderately to strongly asso-
ciated with parochialism at other levels (e.g., extended relatives,
friends, compatriots) (Hruschka andHenrich, 2013). Measures of
parochialism also appear to be associated with amore general syn-
drome of social and psychological tendencies, including tighter
adherence to norms (Gelfand, 2011), greater concerns about obe-
dience and authority (Inglehart et al., 2006), greater religiosity
(Fincher and Thornhill, 2012), and more concerns about purity
violations (Haidt and Graham, 2007).
Thus, many measures of in-group favoritism appear to corre-
late, although out-group hostility may constitute an independent
dimension (Cashdan, 2001). Parochialism at one social scale (e.g.,
immediate family) appears to be associated with parochialism
at other scales (e.g., extended family, community, and country).
And parochialism appears to be one part of a syndrome of other
tendencies toward conformity and obedience.
CROSS-POPULATION VARIATION IN PAROCHIALISM
In the last two decades, psychologists and economists have
begun to identify key cognitive and neurobiological mecha-
nisms underlying parochialism, including perceptions of threat
(Reik et al., 2006) and the role of oxytocin and brain cir-
cuits in modulating behavior toward in- and out-group mem-
bers (De Dreu et al., 2010; Baumgartner et al., 2011; De Dreu,
2012). Researchers have also identified specific kinds of activ-
ities which can increase social closeness to others, including
focused conversations (Aron et al., 1997), synchronized move-
ment (Vacharkulksemsuk and Fredrickson, 2012), and synchro-
nized multisensory inputs (Paladino et al., 2010). Moreover, it
appears that the capacity and propensity to differentiate social
groups arises early in development (Kinzler et al., 2007). However,
researchers have only recently begun to explore why these psy-
chological capacities for parochialism are recruited differently in
different human populations and across different cultural settings
(Miller and Bersoff, 1998; Buchan et al., 2009; Gelfand, 2011;
Van de Vliert, 2011; Fincher and Thornhill, 2012; Hruschka and
Henrich, 2013; Hackman and Hruschka, 2013b).
There are several ways that populations differ in parochial-
ism. First, what counts as a kin tie, a friendship, or an in-group
and what counts as appropriate behaviors with different social
partners is informed by local cultural categories and norms. For
example, most populations in the US do not have a cultural cat-
egory of blood brother, and so there is no clear set of norms or
expectations applied to being in such a relationship (Hruschka,
2010). Second, the social techniques available to organize and
maintain in-groups of varying sizes and scales constrain the
kinds of in-groups to which people can belong. Mass media and
formal schooling makes it much more likely that people can
identify with groups as large as those encompassed by modern
nation-states. World religions disseminate and enforce common
languages, symbols, and rituals which can forge large popula-
tions into a single in-group (Atran and Henrich, 2010). These
social techniques permit the creation of new in-groups that may
have never been possible before. Third, the most salient in-group
category can change quickly based on local practices and con-
texts. Among Enga horticulturalists in Papua New Guinea, rituals
aimed at dehumanizing members of another group can swiftly
recast allies as enemies (Wiessner, 2006), and among the Nuer of
Sudan, changing patterns of competition over resources can re-
align in-groups and out-groups (Evans-Pritchard, 1940). Finally,
and most relevant to this article, given in-groups of similar scales,
individuals from different populations differ remarkably in sev-
eral crucial ways, including how much they trust and avoid
outsiders and how much they favor friends, family, and commu-
nity members (Fukuyama, 1995; Inglehart et al., 2006; Delhey
et al., 2011; Hruschka and Henrich, 2013).
From the perspective of neurobiology, cross-population vari-
ability provides an opportunity to establish and distinguish
those aspects of human brains and psychology that are reli-
ably developing products of pan-human genes from those that
depend on particular culturally-constructed niches (e.g., institu-
tions) or ecological conditions. Grounded in culture-gene coevo-
lutionary theory (McElreath et al., 2003; Henrich and Henrich,
2007), there is now substantial cross-population and develop-
mental evidence suggesting that humans come equipped with
cognitive abilities and psychological motivations to preferentially
attend to, learn from, and interact with co-ethnics—individuals
who share their markers for dress, dialect, language and bodily
ornamentation. For example, infants and young children from
diverse societies readily use dialect and dress to distinguish in-
group members/coethnics (Kinzler et al., 2011, 2012; Mahajan
and Wynn, 2012; Corriveau et al., 2013). On the basis of these
rather sparse cues, infant and children preferentially learn from
these individual (Shutts et al., 2013), seek interaction with them,
and punish them for norm-violations (Schmidt et al., 2012). As
expected from the theory, such ethnic cues can even trump racial
differences in both young children (Kinzler et al., 2009; Corriveau
et al., 2013) and sometimes in adults (Kurzban et al., 2001).
However, such reliably developing features of human cogni-
tion and motivation have to be understood in the light of two
emerging lines of theory and evidence. First, growing up and
ontogenetically adapting to very different environments means
that different populations of humans have different brains and
biologies, even when no genetic differences exist between pop-
ulations (Henrich et al., 2010b,c). Within neuroscience, both
training studies and cross-population research indicates that
brains and bodies develop somewhat differently, in different
environments, and yield distinct patterns of activation and hor-
monal responses to identical stimuli (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996;
Kitayama et al., 2009; Woollett and Maguire, 2011). Second,
mounting evidence indicates that cultural evolutionary processes
have systematically shaped the physical and social (institutional)
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environments that developing humans face. This implies that
cultural evolution has shaped our brains ontogenetically and over
historical time (Henrich et al., 2012; Richerson and Henrich,
2012). For example, behavioral studies of children from ages
3 to 14 and adults across six diverse societies, ranging from
Congo foragers to Westwood Los Angelenos, reveals the emer-
gence of distinct developmental trajectories for social behavior in
different places (House et al., 2013). This pattern is broadly con-
sistent with the presence of market institutions in these societies.
Several theories suggest that cultural evolution has harnessed and
extended aspects of our innate parochialism in forming nations
and religions.
These developments suggest that, rather than attempting to
make potentially dubious inferences by generalizing fromWEIRD
undergraduates (Chiao and Cheon, 2010; Henrich et al., 2010c),
neuroscientists need to develop collaborations that take advan-
tage of both the existing theories discussed in this paper and then
tap the now well-establish psychological diversity in our species.
THEORIES OF CROSS-POPULATION VARIATION IN
PAROCHIALISM
Several theories have been proposed to account for cross-
population differences and historical changes in parochialism.
These theories vary along two major axes. First, they vary in
the specific mechanisms by which individuals and populations
change in response to their environment. Second, they vary in
the specific ecological and social conditions which are posited
to shape parochialism. We first review proposed mechanisms
and then outline the different proposals for relevant environ-
mental conditions, including market integration, religion, and
environmental uncertainty.
MECHANISMS
Parochial behaviors and motivations might change in response
to the environment in several ways. These include genetic adapta-
tion, learning over development, immediate facultative responses,
and social learning (Schaller and Murray, 2010).
One recent example of a genetic mechanism is Chiao and
Blizinsky’s proposal that differences in collectivism may result
from allelic variation in the serotonin transporter functional
polymorphism (5-HTTPLOR). Specifically, collectivist nations
had higher frequencies of the short allele which is associated with
heightened anxiety, harm avoidance, fear conditioning, and atten-
tional bias to negative information (Chiao and Blizinksy, 2010).
Furthermore, their analyses suggested that these genetic differ-
ences may reflect adaptations to infectious disease prevalence.
However, a re-analysis of these data suggests that their findings
can be accounted for by a model of neutral genetic and cultural
change with migration (Eisenberg and Hayes, 2011).
At short time scales, individuals may respond relatively imme-
diately to changing environmental conditions. For example, a vast
body of experimental work indicates that cuing uncertainty in
a number of domains, including mortality, disease, and social
exchange, makes people more likely to favor in-group members
(Kollack, 1994; Navarrete et al., 2004; Heine et al., 2006; Hohman,
2011). Conversely, priming individuals with terms related to
safety and security make them less likely to favor in-group
members (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2001). Thus, parochial motiva-
tions and behaviors can respond quite rapidly to environmental
cues.
At longer time scales that are still shorter than a lifespan,
parochial motivations and behaviors may change in response to
environmental cues during specific windows of development. For
example, Fincher and Thornhill propose that individual’s may
learn about disease risk from the local environment through
recurring immune system activation, which in turn affects social
behaviors and motivations (Fincher and Thornhill, 2012). Recent
studies of exposure to war, suggest that specific parochial moti-
vations and behaviors are sensitive to violence between ages of 7
and 20, but not before or after that window (Bauer et al., forth-
coming). In addition to direct learning through exposure to their
environment, individuals may also learn from others about key
aspects of the environment, such as local disease risk, threat of
mortality, and risk of inter-group conflict (Fincher and Thornhill,
2012).
In addition to learning environmental cues which may shape
parochialism, individuals may also learn relevant social norms
about who are members of one’s in-group and how one should
treat insiders and outsiders under different conditions (Henrich
et al., 2010a). For example, individuals frequently engaging in
market interactions may learn and eventually internalize norms
about dealing fairly with relative strangers and anonymous others
(Henrich et al., 2010a).
Each of these mechanisms would lead to different expectations
about the time scale of response, from months, to decades, to
centuries (Schaller and Murray, 2010). Apparent behavioral fit
with specific environments may also result from a combination
of co-evolutionary feedback loops involving these mechanisms.
For example, infectious disease risk, which is proposed by some
theories to be a driver of parochialism, is not simply an exoge-
nous element of the environment. Rather it has changed in
response to the emergence of public health institutions, which
were in turn the outcome of early large-scale collective attempts
to improve others’ health. Such feedback between environments
and behavior can lead to significant co-evolutionary trajectories.
MARKET INTEGRATION
The market integration hypothesis proposes that market norms
emphasizing fair treatment of anonymous others have cultur-
ally evolved to sustain mutually beneficial exchanges in contexts
demanding frequent interaction with strangers or ephemeral
interactants. As, individuals increasingly interact with markets,
they adopt and internalize these norms, and markets spread more
successfully in places where such norms are already in place
(Henrich et al., 2010a). Thus, individuals with greater market
exposure will be more likely to have adopted or internalized these
norms and thus will treat anonymous others more fairly. This
hypothesis has been tested, replicated, and extended in two sepa-
rate projects covering 24 different societies from Siberia to New
Guinea. Overall, more market integrated societies tend to split
pots of money more evenly with anonymous others, independent
of the threat of punishment, income, wealth, education, commu-
nity size, sex, and age (Henrich et al., 2005, 2010a). Since such
equitable behavior arises even when punishment is not possible,
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and anonymity is assured, the authors argue it is guided by inter-
nalized local norms. More recent studies among 57 communities
in Ethiopia which are tied to their land by customary rights
suggests that the relationship between market integration and
prosocial behavior with anonymous others is not due to selec-
tive migration (Rustagi et al., 2010; also see Voors et al., 2012 for
findings from Burundi). And, recent experimental work on “giv-
ing” byWesterners show that such responses are automatic (Rand
et al., 2012) and rely on the brain’s reward circuitry (Fehr and
Camerer, 2007; Harbaugh et al., 2007), suggesting that they do
reflect internalized patterns of behavior.
RELIGION
Many religious traditions emphasize the importance of helping
strangers and treating others fairly, and thus enculturation in
specific religions may reduce parochialism—either within one’s
religion or even across religions. One current theory holds that
modern world religions, such as Christianity and Islam, were
able to spread precisely because they effectively enculturated
norms of prosocial behavior which galvanized large-scale cooper-
ation among relatively anonymous strangers (Atran and Henrich,
2010). According to this view, followers of modern world reli-
gions, such as Christianity and Islam, will be more likely to have
internalized these norms of prosocial behavior and will thus treat
anonymous others with greater fairness and generosity. Findings
from the cross-society studies described earlier are also consis-
tent with this hypothesis (Henrich et al., 2010a), showing that
adherents to modern world religions offer more in bargaining
experiments. Similar experiments among Western populations
have shown that unconsciously priming Christians, but not athe-
ists, with “God” causing them to be more equitable in bargaining
games, cheat less, cooperate more and sometimes punish selfish-
ness to a greater extent (Randolph-Seng andNielsen, 2007; Shariff
and Norenzayan, 2007; Ahmed, 2009; McKay et al., 2011; Laurin
et al., 2012).
World religions may also exhibit variation in how strongly
they affect parochialism. Experiments meant to measure trust in
anonymous transactions show that religious people are trusted
more, especially by other religious people. Consistent with this,
work from psychology suggests Christians trust each other more
because they believe other Christians know God is watching
(Gervais et al., 2011). Ritual participation seems to have effects
independent of belief in God: participation in rituals increases in-
group favoritism, in the form of cooperation (Sosis and Ruffle,
2003; Ruffle and Sosis, 2006), and is associated with support for
out-group aggression (Ginges et al., 2009).
Protestantism may be of particular interest here. Weber,
and more recently Fukuyama, have argued that a key effect of
Protestantism was to “shatter the fetters” of the extended fam-
ily (Weber, 1951; Fukuyama, 2011), and recent authors have
pinned this on Protestant core values of self-reliance and indi-
vidualism which potentially led to less investment in family,
friends, and local in-groups (Lipset and Lenz, 2000; Treisman,
2000). Consistent with this, cross-national analyses show that
majority Protestant countries consistently report less favoritism,
in-group bias, and out-group avoidance, after adjusting for eco-
nomic security and government effectiveness, than countries with
other religions in themajority—including Orthodox Christianity,
Catholicism, and Islam (Hruschka and Henrich, 2013).
GLOBALIZATION
The globalization hypothesis proposes that as people are increas-
ingly exposed to individuals outside their community through
new forms of mass media, including newspapers, the internet,
social media, television, and movies, and through new forms of
social interaction, they are less likely to think in terms of in-
groups and out-groups and more likely to imagine humankind
as a “we” where there are no “outsiders” (Buchan et al., 2009).
Thus, individuals with greater interactions with global com-
munication (e.g., televisions, print media, and employment in
transnational firms) will be more inclined to engage in collec-
tive action with individuals outside of their immediate in-group.
This hypothesis overlaps with the market integration hypothe-
sis, but proposes that many kinds of interactions, including mere
exposure to people from other countries through mass media,
can change responses to outsiders. Consistent with this hypoth-
esis, Buchan et al. (2009) found that contribution to global public
goods increases with increasing exposure to different forms of
mass media.
EXISTENTIAL OR MATERIAL SECURITY HYPOTHESES
Here we group three related hypotheses that focus on the effects
of various form of material or existential security on individual
decision making, development, and cultural evolution. The first,
generalized insecurity, casts a broad net by proposing that inse-
curity will influence parochialism, while the others suggest that
individuals respond selectively to specific kinds of threats, such as
pathogens, inter-group conflict, and thermic stress.
Generalized insecurity
Variants of the institutional quality hypothesis propose that infor-
mal and formal institutions change the costs and benefits of
parochialism, which in turn shape social norms and behavior by
a number of potential mechanisms. Public services, global mar-
kets, and social safety nets that mitigate material threats and
guarantee safe interaction with anonymous partners may ren-
der investments in an expansive network of kith and kin less
necessary as alternative forms of social insurance. It may also
foster greater interaction and trust with a larger set of individ-
uals (Inglehart andWelzel, 2005; Inglehart et al., 2006; Hruschka,
2010; Hruschka and Henrich, 2013). Ample experimental and
observational evidence demonstrates the role of economic, exis-
tential, and symbolic security on parochial attitudes and behav-
iors (Kollack, 1994; Navarrete et al., 2004; Heine et al., 2006;
Canetti-Nisim et al., 2008; Proulx and Heine, 2010; Hohman,
2011; Kaplan et al., 2012). Conversely, priming individuals with
terms related to safety and security make them less likely to favor
in-group members (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2001). And a body of
work in political science and economics has examined how norms
and institutions reduce barriers to trust, encourage cross-group
cooperation and discourage parochialism in ethnically-divided
societies (Knight, 1992; Jackman and Miller, 2004; Whitt, 2010).
Several lines of observational evidence are also consistent with
this hypothesis that stronger institutions and less exposure to
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generalized risk of famine, disease, and inter-group conflict are
associated with reduced in-group favoritism (Cashdan, 2001;
Inglehart et al., 2006; Whitt, 2010; Hruschka and Henrich, 2013).
Pathogen stress
The above hypothesis proposed that parochialism responds to
existential or material insecurity, in general. However, there are
other, more domain-specific, hypotheses that propose that spe-
cific forms of insecurity may have parochial effects. Recently,
several evolutionary researchers have proposed that parochial-
ism constitutes a form of behavioral immune system against the
spread of pathogens. According to this hypothesis, in regions
with high risk of infection by dangerous pathogens, individuals
will preferentially interact with in-group members in a way that
insulates them from infection by out-group members (Schaller
and Murray, 2010; Fincher and Thornhill, 2012). Though orig-
inally predicting avoidance of and hostile attitudes toward out-
groups, the theory has been extended to account for other aspects
of parochialism as well, including ingroup favoritism and bias
(Fincher and Thornhill, 2012). This hypothesis differs crucially
from other hypotheses by positing that the adaptive mechanisms
responsible for this effect are specific to pathogen risk and were
designed to impede the spread of pathogens or to provide social
support specifically in case of infection. Different mechanisms
have been proposed, including sensitivity to immune system
activation, social learning of local disease risks and direct obser-
vation of parasitic infections, all of which would lead to relatively
fast facultative responses. Other longer-termmechanisms include
culturally evolutionary processes by which groups which have
social norms preventing and mitigating threats of infection (e.g.,
parochial social interaction) are more likely to spread and persist
in regions of high endemic pathogen threat (Schaller andMurray,
2010).
Emerging experimental evidence suggests that people do
indeed adjust some social motivations and behaviors (i.e., con-
formism) to specific cues of pathogen threats over and above
generalized threats (Murray and Schaller, 2012). However, cross-
national and cross-state studies have shown mixed support for
this hypothesis as an explanation for extant cross-population
variation in parochialism (Currie and Mace, 2012; Fincher
and Thornhill, 2012; Cashdan and Steele, 2013; Hruschka and
Henrich, 2013; Hackman and Hruschka, 2013a; Hruschka et al.,
submitted).
Inter-group conflict hypothesis
Another insecurity hypothesis focuses narrowly on how the threat
of, or experience of, intergroup conflict may strengthen in-group
preferences, including egalitarianism. Using simple choice tasks
in two post-conflict societies, the Republic of Georgia and Sierra
Leone, Bauer et al. (forthcoming) show that the experience of war
creates an enduring increase in individuals’ in-group egalitarian
motivations, while not influencing their motivations toward out-
group individuals. However, the effect of war only left an endur-
ing mark on motivation if individual experienced the war during
a developmental window from roughly age 7 to 20. The effect of
war experience had no impact on those under about age 7, and
only small effects on those who experience the war past roughly
age 20. These results are supported by other work showing that
senior Israeli citizens were more willing to punish norm-violators
in a bargaining game during the conflict with Hezbollah, com-
pared to both pre- and post-war measures (Gneezy and Fessler,
2012). Working in Burundi, Voors et al. show that victimization
in war increases people altruism toward their neighbors, as well
as their temporal discounting and risk preferences. This work
also examines the effects of non-war related shocks to security,
including draught, flooding, and pestilence. This work shows that
the experience of droughts also increased altruism toward in-
groupmembers, an independent effect, but did not alter temporal
discounting or risk preferences. This suggests that war-related
insecurity vs. drought-related insecurity may produce somewhat
different psychological effects (Voors et al., 2012), supporting the
notion that these are distinct domains. However, aside from this
finding, all of these data are also consistent with the generalized
insecurity hypothesis.
Thermic stress hypothesis
The climate-economics hypothesis proposes that much of human
culture is an adaptive response to thermic stress—either extreme
cold or extreme heat—but that this can be buffered by economic
resources. In the case of in-group favoritism, Van der Vliert argues
that populations facing extreme temperature stress without the
economic resources needed to adapt to that stress respond psy-
chologically in a number of ways, including greater preferences
for authoritarian leadership and for favoring members of one’s
in-group (Van de Vliert, 2011; Van de Vliert and Postmes, 2012).
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN ASSESSING
CROSS-POPULATION HYPOTHESES
In the last decade, the observation of substantial between-
population differences in parochialism has inspired considerable
theoretical work on the possible causes of these between-
population differences. This is exciting progress, and this review
describes a number of promising theories that may account for
cross-population variation.
However, there are serious challenges in efforts to discrim-
inate between these different hypotheses and to identify the
specific mechanisms by which parochialism rises and falls in soci-
eties. Most studies have relied on observational cross-population
designs, raising concerns about causality, identification of specific
mechanisms, the direction of effects, and the time-scale of adap-
tation. Several strategies can provide some check against these
issues.
The first task is to begin culling hypotheses through strate-
gic model comparison rather than testing each hypothesis against
a straw man null model. This involves identifying different
predictions across models and then finding appropriate cross-
population data which can discriminate between these pre-
dictions. For example, in a recent study of population-level
parochialism across countries, Hruschka and Henrich directly
compared the parasite stress hypothesis with the material inse-
curity hypothesis using novel checks against regional auto-
correlation, new longitudinal data to assess reverse causation,
and an instrumental variable to check for the effects of omit-
ted variables. These results provided consistent support for the
material insecurity hypothesis. It also challenged prior studies
supporting the parasite stress hypothesis which had not included
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these methodological checks. In another paper, Hackman and
Hruschka re-assessed analyses of US data which had previously
found an association between pathogen stress and collectivism.
With new data stratified by race, they showed the observed associ-
ations across states were due exclusively to substantial differences
across US Whites and US Blacks. They also found support for an
alternative hypothesis related to the material insecurity hypoth-
esis (Hruschka and Henrich, 2013; Hackman and Hruschka,
2013a). Of course, such model comparison using observational
data does not definitively show that the “winning” hypothesis is
correct. However, it helps winnow the playing field.
Another important check can come from combining psycho-
logical experiments with cross-population studies in order to
triangulate between potential psychological processes and the
macro-scale correlates of cross-population variation. The find-
ings of experiments alone may not scale up easily to account for
cross-population differences, and cross-population correlations
without grounding in established psychological mechanisms can
easily be explained away as spurious associations. Integrating
these two orders of data can ensure that hypotheses are consistent
at both the individual and population level. A number of theories,
including the market integration, religion, institutional quality,
and pathogen stress hypotheses have begun to accrue data at both
of these levels.
To mitigate some concerns about causality, mechanism, and
directionality, the social sciences offer a number of tools that
provide further checks on findings from cross-population obser-
vational data. Instrumental variable analysis commonly used
in economics provides one additional check by identifying
quasi-experimental assignments in observational data. For exam-
ple, Acemoglu et al. used the mortality rates of early settlers
in European colonies (1600–1875) as an instrumental vari-
able which is expected to affect contemporary government
effectiveness—an important variable in the material security
hypotheses of parochialism. There is ample historical evidence
that European colonizers avoided settling in places with high
mortality rates, such as in the Belgian Congo (McNeill, 1977;
Acemoglu et al., 2001), and instead of settling, they set up extrac-
tive systems. In situations of low mortality, on the other hand,
colonizers settled in larger numbers and brought with them insti-
tutions, such as respect of private property, checks and balances
in government, and equality of opportunity, which in turn fos-
tered greater government effectiveness that persisted even after
independence (Acemoglu et al., 2001). These measures of set-
tler mortality act in some ways as quasi-experimental assign-
ments of countries to different levels of government effectiveness,
and Acemoglu et al. used this quasi-experimental assignment
to examine the effect of government institutions on economic
growth. More recently, Hruschka and Henrich have used the same
reasoning to examine the effect of government institutions on
parochialism (Hruschka and Henrich, 2013).
As access to longitudinal data increases with longer running
cross-national surveys, it will also be possible to assess the tem-
poral precedence and coincidence of different changes within
populations (Inglehart et al., 2006; Hruschka and Henrich, 2013).
For example, between 1925 and 2005, US samples have shown
steadily decreasing avoidance of other ethnic groups in a number
of domains—as in-laws, friends, neighbors, and fellow citizens
(Bogardus, 1933; Parrillo and Donoghue, 2005). Long-term lon-
gitudinal data like this may provide insights into what factors
most readily account for long-term changes in parochialism and
how rapidly changes occur. Migration studies, originally devel-
oped in epidemiology, but now applied in economics, also show
some promise in identifying the time-scale by which different
aspects of parochialism change across generations who are put
into novel contexts (Guiso et al., 2006; Fisman and Miguel, 2007;
Giuliano and Alesina, 2010). For example, Giuliano and Alesina
used such a design to show that second generation immigrants
carry “cultural baggage” from their home country. Specifically,
even after two generations, immigrants from countries with
greater stated investment in family ties moved less and lived with
their parents longer (Giuliano and Alesina, 2010).
Another approach is to look for natural experiments, as Bauer
et al. did with their investigation of the effects of war on parochial-
ism (Bauer et al., forthcoming). They looked around the globe for
situations in which the effects of war on individuals, households,
and communities were—at least plausibly—randomwith respect
to individuals’ own parochial motivations. Refugees and soldiers
would be relatively easier to access compared to the approach they
took, but both fleeing and being alive might be caused by their
particular social motivations (therefore endogenous). As checks
on the natural experiment assumption, they also (1) examined
whether observables, like ethnicity or age, predicted experienc-
ing war (they did not) and (2) performed their analyses just on
those who were children at the time of the conflict (and thus
have less control). These analyses support the idea that the experi-
ence of war was imposed exogenously, and thus provides a natural
experiment.
Despite all of these possible checks and triangulations, obser-
vational data is still plagued by concerns about endogeneity
and non-random assignment of cases which can threaten causal
interpretations. Thus, once hypothesis are culled and honed
through the above-mentioned techniques, a growing body of
field experiments in economics, public health, and development
currently used to understand health and development holds
promise in assessing specific mechanisms by which economic,
social, and environmental conditions inhibit or foster parochial-
ism (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). With this combination of model
comparison, cross-level confirmation, statistical checks on tem-
poral precedence and causality, and ultimately field experiments
of different hypotheses, this exciting and crowded field of theories
for parochialism will hopefully lead to a clearer understanding
of the specific mechanisms and time scales by which population
differences in parochialism emerge and sustain themselves.
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